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Ruder Report 
Is A Delicate 
N a Lompromise 
By Constantine N. Katsoris 
Two years ago, the National Associa- 
tion of Securities Dealers launched an 
ambitious mission: to propose broad 
reforms that would improve the effi- 
ciency and reduce the costs of its own 
arbitration process. 
The NASD appointed an eight- 
member task force for this purpose, 
including practitioners and academics 
with strong backgrounds in arbitra- 
tion, business and public interest law. 
David S. Ruder, former Chairman of 
the SEC, and a professor at Northwest- 
ern University School of Law, headed 
the effort. 
After numerous closed sessions, 
which included testimony by the p u b  
lic members of the Securities Industry 
Conference on Arbitration or SICA, 
the task force issued its report in Janu- 
ary. More than 150 pages long, the so- 
called Ruder Report contains dozens 
of recommendations, some very sig- 
nificant, and some less so. 
Overall, the Report brokers a deli- 
cate compromise between brokerage 
houses and investors. But parts of its 
(continued on page 37) 
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Task Force Proposes Reforms in Arbitration System 
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proffered package don’t serve the p u b  
lic interest. 
The most controversial of the sug- 
gestions is to cap punitive damages at 
two times compensatory damages, up 
to a maximum of $750,000. Among the 
Report’s many other recommenda- 
tions is that parties choose arbitrators 
from lists the NASD supplies; under 
the current system, the NASD selects 
the panel. The Report also proposes 
to: establish mandatory lists of discov- 
erable items; eliminate the so-called 
“six-year rule,” which automatically 
bars consideration of a claim if more 
than six years have elapsed; and con- 
sider consolidating all arbitrations at 
the self-regulatory organizations, or 
SROs, into one forum under the over- 
sight of the NASD. 
What made such proposals neces- 
sary? By the time the NASD as- 
sembled its task force, 
large compensatory awards. By plac- 
ing an arbitrary ceiling on awards, no 
matter how grievous the wrong, it con- 
dones unconscionable conduct. 
The task force justifies its two-tiered 
cap, saying that it “will protect broker- 
dealers from ‘runaway’ awards that 
have no relationship to compensatory 
damages.” Yet the task force fails to 
apply the same standard to its own pro- 
posed remedy. For example, what re- 
lationship does a $750,000 punitive 
damage award have to a $10 million 
compensatory award? 
In addition, the Report suggests that 
claimants should not be entitled to 
punitives if RICO damages are 
awarded for the same claim. However, 
it does not recommend a $750,000 cap 
on damages in RICO claims. Indeed, 
the Report reasons that “RICO awards 
are capped by a treble damage provi- 
An arbitrary ceiling on complaints had surfaced that se- 
curities arbitration had lost its 
way and was becoming more punitive damages, no 
like litigation. One cause was 
the explosion in the number of matter how grievous the 
wrong, “condones securities arbitrations SROs 
needed to handle. As the stakes 
increased, securities arbitra- unconscionable conduct.’’ 
tions became less economical 
and speedy and more like the 
courthouse they were designed to 
avoid. 
Both the NYSE and the NASD an- 
nounced plans to address the trouble- 
some issues facing SRO arbitrations. 
The M E ,  after holding a two day sym- 
posium, issued a report and reconimen- 
dations last year. The Ruder Report is 
the NASD’s effort to calm the troubled 
waters. Here is my critique of its most 
important recommendations. 
Cap on Damages 
The Ruder Report proposes a two- 
tiered ceiling on punitive damages: a 
cap of $750,000, or a limit of two-times 
compensatory damages, whichever is 
less. A rigid limit of $750,000 should 
be rejected out of hand since it is to- 
tally inadequate in situations involving 
sion, thus alleviating the concern of a 
‘runaway’ award.” How does this dif- 
fer from punitives? 
If the industry fears large punitive 
damage awards in arbitration (even 
when punitives reasonably relate to 
compensatory damages), then per- 
haps claims for punitive damages of 
more than $750,000-or all punitive 
damage claims-should be removed 
from arbitration and returned to the 
courts. There parties have the proce- 
dural safeguard of an appeal more 
readily available. On the other hand, 
if brokerage agreements force the pub- 
lic into arbitration with a $750,000 cap 
on punitives, then it’s time to revisit 
the issue ofwhether these contracts of 
adhesion are enforceable. 
Nor would I necessarily impose a cap 
/ 
of two-times Compensatory damages. 
Courts don’t usually have such a re- 
striction; their chief limitation in 
awarding punitive damages is that the 
award shouldn’t offend constitutional 
sensibilities. 
Still, several federal statutes, such as 
the Clayton Act, RICO and the Futures 
Trading Practices Act, limit overall 
treble damages (for both compensa- 
tory and punitive damages). There- 
fore, capping punitive damages at a 
reasonable multiple of compensatory 
damages might be palatable if it was 
part of an overall tradeoff: for ex- 
ample, in exchange for predispute ar- 
bitration agreements that didn’t 
require the parties to waive punitives. 
Arbitrator Selection 
Under the current system, SROs select 
the arbitrators, giving each side one 
peremptory challenge, and an 
unlimited number of challenges 
for cause. The Ruder Report 
recommends adopting the 
American Arbitration Associa- 
tion system in which the forum 
supplies lists of arbitrators, from 
which the parties select a panel. 
Both systems have their advan- 
tages and disadvantages. Al- 
though the suggested change 
does not necessarily result in a 
betterqualified panel, it has the attrac- 
tion of letting the parties pick their 
own panel. However, the system might 
not work in a geographic area where 
there aren’t many qualified arbitrators. 
If the parties reject all the arbitrators 
on the list, it might be necessary to shift 
the arbitration to another locale, less 
convenient for the claimant. 
Discoverable Items 
Discovery controversies are beginning 
to sap the vitality of the SRO arbitra- 
tions. Often those controversies are 
unnecessary and represent posturing 
on the part of either, or both, parties. 
Mandatory lists of discoverable items 
would help eliminate unnecessary de- 
lay and expense. Still, the required lists 
(continued on  following page) 
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should be presumptive only: arbitra- 
tors should retain ultimate authority 
to decide what’s discoverable, based on 
the circumstances of a case. 
Six-Year Rule 
Section 4 of SICA’s Uniform 
Code of Arbitration (making 
claims ineligible for SRO ar- 
from actual, inferential, subtle, practi- 
cal or any other kind of imaginable 
pressure. To the extent possible, it 
should be independent of the indus- 
try, independent of the plaintiffs bar, 
and, to some extent, independent of 
the SEC-except when the SEC is ex- 
ercising its general oversight role. A 
bitration if six years has “If brokerage agreements 
elapsed from the event giving 
rise to the claim) was initiallv force the public into 
and the AAA)-should assess the sug- 
gestions of these two reports, and de- 
cide what to do next. 
Will the NASD implement the Ruder 
Report suggestions, or will it first seek 
the advice and consent of SICA and the 
other SROs? Unfortunately, the Re- 
port suggests that the NASD might 
choose the lone-ranger ap- 
proach. The present system 
of checks and balances, in 
place for 20 years, has worked 
relatively well. I t  has resulted 
a matter of administrative in steady and meaningful 
convenience ; the drafters arbitration with a $750,000 change from the Balkanized 
thought that in cases arising 
out of events more than six 
cap on punitives, then itys 
years old, the pre-hearing dis- time to revisit the issue of 
closure procedures ofarbitra- 
tion were inadequate. The whether these Contracts of 
adhesion are enforceable.” AAA has no similar rule. SICA never intended to fore- 
close litigation when a claim was 
too stale for arbitration. Unfor- 
tunately, some courts have donejust that. 
Other courts have ruled that the issue of 
eligibility should first be decided by the 
courts, not by the arbitrators. 
In effect, the six-year eligibility rule 
has caused havoc with claimants by sub  
jecting them to unnecessary delay, 
expense, and prejudice. The Ruder Re- 
port takes a giant step toward simplify- 
ing securities arbitration by recom- 
mending that this distorted rule be 
eliminated. 
Single Forum 
A more controversial proposal raises 
the possibility of establishing a single 
forum within an existing SRO. This 
proposal isn’t new. Several years ago, 
some observers in the securities indus- 
try recommended that-in the inter- 
est of uniformity and economy-all 
the SROs leave public securities arbi- 
tration to the NASD. The Ruder Re- 
port echoes their suggestion, but 
ignores the general mistrust of the 
public and the courts in SRO arbitra- 
tions. SICA helped to overcome that 
mistrust. 
Ideally, securities arbitration should 
be moved from the SROs to a totally 
separate and independent forum, as I 
recommended more than a decade 
ago. To have credibility with the p u b  
lic, such a forum must be independent 
single SRO forum under the NASD 
umbrella, no matter how well inten- 
tioned, could not possibly be totally 
independent, 
In the past, the SEC has opposed 
the idea of a single forum, preferring 
the competitive choices offered by the 
various SROs. Perhaps a truly inde- 
pendent single forum is a Utopian 
dream; but until such a forum can be 
created, the SEC’s theory of competi- 
tive forces is preferable-particularly 
in an atmosphere where arbitration 
is basically mandatory. Why should 
public customers be forced to arbi- 
trate before an NASD forum when the 
disputes are with brokers who are 
members of other SROs, and involve 
transactions executed solely at the 
other SROs? 
What Next? 
Unlike the NYSE Report, which flowed 
from an open debate, the Ruder Re- 
port grew out of a broad spectrum of 
opinions presented in numerous 
closed sessions. The two reports give 
enlightened insight into the problems 
facing securities arbitration, and on 
many points reach similar conclusions. 
Now, an independent SICA-consist- 
ing of ten SROs, four public members, 
the Securities Industry Association and 
many invited guests (such as the SEC 
procedures of the past. It also 
has prevented some ill-con- 
ceived ideas from finding 
their way into securities arbi- 
tration. 
Under the present system, 
SICA, an independent body, 
proposes rule changes. The 
SRO boards approve and file 
them with the SEC. The SEC then de- 
cides what the rule will be. By that time, 
all participants have had at least two 
bites at the apple: the public at the 
SICA level, and at the 19(b) filing; the 
various SROs at the SICA level, and at 
their board’s level; the industry at the 
SICA level, at the SRO level (where it 
lobbies intensely), and again at the 
19(b) filing; and, the SEC at the SICA 
level (where SEC representatives and 
others are invited guests), and as the 
final word at the 19(b) filing. 
This pattern for rule changes in se- 
curities arbitration should be pre- 
served. As an independent body, SICA 
establishes and maintains a level play- 
ing field. Its presence, like a cop on 
the beat these past 20 years, has been 
reassuring to regulators, the courts, 
and the investing public. i 
FURTHER READING 
Like the NASD, the New York 
Stock Exchange has investigated 
the troiiblcsonie aspects facing 
SRO arbitrations. 
Edited proceedings of the 
NYSE’s two-day symposium on 
the subject appear in 63Fordhnvi 
Lazo It 1495-1 695 ( 1995) . 
